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Abstract:  
 
This paper investigates the interactions between policy drivers and academic practice in international 
research collaboration. It draws on the case of the Open Research Area (ORA), a funding scheme in the 
social sciences across four national research agencies, seeking to boost collaboration by supporting 
³LQWHJUDWHG´ SURMHFWV. The paper discusses the scheme¶V JRYHUQDQFH DQG LWV place within the European 
policy space EHIRUH WXUQLQJ WR DZDUGHG UHVHDUFKHUV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV RI LWV RULJLQDOLW\ DQG LPSDFW RQ WKHLU
SURMHFW¶V HPHUJHQFH DQG GHYHORSPHQW DraZLQJ RQ %RXUGLHX¶V ILHOG WKHRU\ ZH DQDO\VH WKH VFKHPH¶V
capacity to challenge UHVHDUFKHUV¶habitual collaborative practice as well as the hierarchical foundations of 
the social science field. We relate the discourses of researchers, located in France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, to such structural dimensions of the academic profession as, 
disciplinary cultures, institutional environments and national performance management of research 
careers. The paper argues that the ORA introduces novel mechanisms of power sharing and answerability 
in social sciences research capable of unsettling the autonomy of the scientific field. This analysis offers a 
new perspective on the often unquestioned superiority of the model of international collaboration induced 
by schemes such as ORA. 
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Introduction 
 
Policies aiming to stimulate research collaboration are not a new phenomenon (e.g. see Sonnenwald, 2007 
for a review). In Europe, large scale cooperation programmes have been existing since the 1950s (e.g. 
CERN, EURATOM) and in the 1970s, several intergovernmental funding schemes were introduced, 
driven by the ideas of networking and transnational cooperation as pDUWRID³FRPPRQSURMHFW´/DZQDQG
Grek 2012: 31). However the context of the collapse of communism in Europe, of increased economic 
competition within and outside Europe, and of the rise of the ³NQRZOHGJH-EDVHGHFRQRP\´SDUDGLJPLQ
international organisations (OECD, World Bank) from the early 1990 ( Robertson 2008), contributed to a 
VKLIW LQ WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI WKLV SURMHFW $ µVRIW¶ DSSURDFK WR JRYHUQLQJ NQRZOHGJH SURGXFWLRQ LQ
education and research) gradually imposed itself in Europe, involving networks, professional 
associations, public/private partnerships, and other enabling arrangements FDSDEOH RI SURGXFLQJ ³QHZ
strategLF JHRJUDSKLHV´ /DZQDQG*UHN  2012: 67). The launch of the European Research Area (ERA) 
strategy by the European Union (EU) in 2000 illustrates this process of strategic construction of European 
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policy spaces. It arguably accelerated the emergence of networks, empowered existing ones (Breschi and 
Gusmao 2004) and extended support for international research collaboration beyond resource-intensive 
disciplines. Such EU-led initiatives have had a defining structuring impact on the collaborative practice of 
academic researchers in Europe and beyond (Gusmao 2001; Delanghe, Muldur and Soete 2009). 
Yet policy research in Europe and internationally is certainly not the only structuring factor of 
collaborative practice, particularly in a profession for which collaboration in the form of co-authorship, 
SHHU UHYLHZLQJ DQG DFDGHPLF YLVLWV KDV ³DOZD\V H[LVWHG DV D IRUP RI VRFLDO RUJDQLVDWLRQ DQG LQTXLU\´
(Papatsiba, 2013: 436). Incidentally, studies have also shown how most of these EU strategies and policy 
schemes promoting research co-operation and collaboration were championed by researchers themselves 
(Nedeva 2013), and in particular those already enjoying dominant positions at the core of established 
networks within a fiercely competitive profession.  Finally, policy agendas at the European level also 
come to life in the context of organisations (universities, research centres) whose missions and practice 
are evolving under multiple forces and steering models(Deem 2006; Hazelkorn 2009; Gornitzka and 
Maassen 2000), and in which research careers are increasingly driven by quantifiable indicators of esteem 
and impact (Henkel 2000; Lucas 2009; Musselin 2007). Within this context of converging policy 
processes and New Public Management reforms, we studied the interactions between policy drivers and 
academic practice in research collaboration using the case of the Open Research Area (ORA). This 
multilateral research funding scheme brings together four European national research councils, and seeks 
WRERRVWFROODERUDWLRQE\VXSSRUWLQJ³LQWHJUDWHG´SURMHFWVLQWKHVRFLDOVFLHQFHV. The paper highlights the 
place of the scheme within the European policy space and the ideological underpinnings of its governance 
EHIRUH WXUQLQJ WR DZDUGHG UHVHDUFKHUV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV RI LWV RULJLQDOLW\ DQG LPSDFW RQ WKHLU SURMHFW¶V 
emergence and development. Drawing RQ %RXUGLHX¶V field theory (Bourdieu 1977), we analyse the 
VFKHPH¶VFDSDFLW\ to challenge social science UHVHDUFKHUV¶habitual collaborative practice as well as the 
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hierarchical foundations of the social science  field (Bourdieu 1999) and its positional autonomy vis a vis 
external forces and cognate fields (Maton 2005; Camic 2011).  
Field intersections 
 
The autonomy of the scientific field, once established by Bourdieu as a prime consideration in 
understanding the academic profession, is being discussed here in its intersections with research policy 
promoting collaborations. 5HVHDUFKHUV¶strategies to enhance and mobilise their reputational capital ± the 
most important of all in that field according to Bourdieu (2004) -  are increasingly constrained if not 
aligned with institutional strategies themselves in competition to secure funding and reputation (Henkel 
2000). It is therefore likely that renewed conceptions of funded collaboration expressed in schemes such 
as ORA and their expectations regarding the impact of collaboration on research orientation and 
productivity  will further undermine the autonomy of the academic profession in its regulation of research 
practice and outputs (Musselin 2007).  
ORA was introduced in 2009 with the aim to promote cross-national research in social sciences. The 
scheme was developed outside EU supported schemes, building upon bilateral schemes between the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlands. In this paper, we draw on contextual information, 
policy documents and on 18 interviews conducted in 2013 with the principal investigators of thirteen 
funded projects from an early round of the scheme. We sought to understand how conceptions of research 
collaboration among European social scientists anticipate and accommodate the changes induced in their 
professional practice by changing policy and institutional environments. We initially carried out a 
mapping of those projects using publicly available data such as project presentations on the participating 
UHVHDUFKFRXQFLOV¶ZHEVLWHVJUDQWHHV¶&9VSRVWHGRQWKHLULQVWLWXWLRQV¶ZHEVLWHELEOLRPHWULFLQIRUPDWLRQ
available from Scopus and Google Scholar. Alongside information about co-authorship between or 
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among collaborating researchers, we focused on data reporting their more informal links such as 
academic invitations, but also joint participations in conferences/symposia, editorial or various advisory 
boards, as well as connections through networks or large EU projects. Interviews were conducted by 
Skype or telephone. Our aim was to collect discourses on the meanings associated with collaboration in 
research, its constraints and opportunities, and to relate these to the experience of their ORA funded 
project from the bidding stage to its current point, against the backdrop of disciplinary traditions, 
intuitional and national contexts, as well as individual careers.   
Conceptually, our discussion conceives of academic researchers as actors whose practice is influenced 
µERWKE\VWUDWHJLFFDOFXODWLRQ«DQGE\UHIHUHQFHWRDIDPLOLDUVHWRIPRUDORUFRJQLWLYHWHPSODWHVHDFK
RIZKLFKPD\GHSHQGRQ WKHFRQILJXUDWLRQRIH[LVWLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ +DOODQG7D\ORU96: 955). They 
are also agents competing for positions in a field governed by ³FRPSHWLWLYHVWUXJJOH´ for the ³monopoly 
of scientific authority´%RXUGLHX, 1999: 19).Their ideas of collaboration and expectations of the scheme 
are therefore related to the dynamics operating at the intersection of policy frameworks and local research 
spaces (primarily institutional and national) with that scientific field (the social sciences in this case). The 
focus on a policy scheme allows to transcend the false dichotomy between internalist and externalist 
perspectives on the academic profession and the higher education and scientific fields (Bourdieu 2004; 
Maton 2005; Camic 2011). Most researchers interviewed for this study work in universities and are 
therefore operating at the intersection of fairly autonoPRXV\HWODUJHO\VKDUHGVHWVRI³YDOXHVDQGPDNHUV
of achievements´ (Maton 2005: 689). National higher education sectors, scientific networks, scientific 
collaborative schemes, constitute the main fields of social practice that drive their everyday interactions. 
But it is in the scientific field that they have acquired and cultivated the symbolic authority, (that is the 
³scientific FDSLWDO´ DV ³SURGXFW RI UHFRJQLWLRQE\ FRPSHWLWRUV´ (Bourdieu 2004: 55) which traditionally 
has mattered the most to their career and social prestige. It is therefore within this field that we locate our 
concluding discussion.  
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The Open Research Area (ORA) : A funding scheme and a political statement 
 
European research funding and governance at the turn of the 21st century 
 
Although firmly set at the heart of the European research landscape, ORA is not a programme initiated or 
financially supported by the European Union. As discussed in introduction its emergence has to be 
understood as a ³QRQ(8-GULYHQ´FRQWULEXWLRQWR the ³(XURSHRINQRZOHGJH´ (Elken et al. 2011) by the 
research councils of four core members of the European Research Area.  
From the 1970s, the EU policy, driven by the principle of subsidiary, had always been to stimulate 
cooperation between member states, including science cooperation. However, Research only became a 
Community policy in 1986, leading the Commission to take a commanding role in the coordination of 
national policies from the mid-1990s. By then, the Framework Programme (FP) had become an important 
source of funding for most member states (Guzzetti 2009).  
The formalisation of the European Research Area (ERA) is commonly attributed to the 2000 Lisbon 
Strategy aiming to transform Europe into a world-leading Knowledge-based society. The Open Method of 
Coordination µbased on principles of voluntary convergence of States and reciprocal learning process 
though diffusion of best practice¶ (Guzzetti 2009: 74) signalled a cultural change in the mode of 
collaboration between national agencies involved, as well as in the coordinating role of the E.U. To some 
extent, the flexible steering championed by the ORA scheme (discussed in more detail below) is a 
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reflexion of this new approach to research governance, but takes it further by bypassing the necessarily 
normative role played by the European Commission as coordinator. 
ORA also emerges in the context of the launching of the European Research Council (ERC) in 2007, 
which indicates a move in European research away from the principle of µjuste retour¶ or formal criteria 
of multinationality (Guzzetti 2009) and claims instead WR µstimulate scientific excellence in Europe by 
supporting the very best, creative researchers of any nationality and from any scientific domain, including 
the VRFLDO VFLHQFHVDQGKXPDQLWLHV¶ (ERC 2010). As limited as it is in terms of volume compared with 
core EU funding schemes (i.e. the ERC represents 17% of the overall Horizon 2020 budget), the 
launching of the Council denotes a significant change in the delegation mode of European research 
funding. Great emphasis is being placed on incentive-type instruments for funding, and on a more 
³LQGLUHFW VWHHULQJ´ Potì and Reale 2007; Luukkonen 2014) also observed in an increasing number of 
national contexts at the same time.   
The ERC, and to some extent the broader policy reconceptualisation of research collaboration in Europe 
discussed above, are undoubtedly the result of tensions and lobbying from member states and research 
organizations within the Union (Nedeva 2013; Luukkonen 2014). The active role played by the European 
Science Foundation (ESF) and the European Union Research Organisations Heads of Research Councils 
(EUROHORCs) who initiated the ORA scheme, is specifically worth noting here. The ESF in particular 
believed that an ERC would employ simple and flexible management structures and procedures that 
ZRXOGQRWEHµburdensome for the scientific community that LWVHUYHV¶ (ESF 2003: 15).  
 
ORA within the new European research landscape 
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At the time of its introduction, ORA supported social science cross-national research in four European 
countries, using the procedures for research funding allocation of their respective national research 
councils. In many respects, this model replicates joint frameworks described as following the 
µcondominium¶ model (e.g. Schmitter 1996) of decentralised integration, aimed at national partners 
working together µon a specific funding scheme, without delegating decisions concerning policies to a 
supranational body¶ (Lepori et al. 2014: 393). National agencies were therefore key actors in the 
launching and management of ORA. The scheme is primarily about promoting strong collaborative ties 
amongst excellent researchers and addresses the social sciences in their greatest diversity without 
promoting particular research programmes.  
The financial commitment of participating countries in ORA is modest1. However the initiative carries far 
more significance when considered in its policy dimensions. Bilateral and small scale multilateral 
schemes had been existing before but very few saw the light after the creation of the ERA when the EU 
became the central orchestrator of public research funding. This is not to say that states became irrelevant, 
but their role FKDQJHG DV ³WKH European Union focused on initiatives with a higher level of 
institutionalization in the coordination-integration logics, whereas National States transitioned to lighter 
initiatives oULHQWHGWRZDUGFROODERUDWLRQ´/HSRUL et al. 2014: 398). 
Most joint programmes in Europe therefore became either European ±led or coordinated (ERA-NETs) or 
benefited from a European financial top-up. According to Lepori et al. (2014), cases of small-scale 
                                                          
1
 In the first round, 132 applications were received, of which 123 were accepted; 15 projects were successful and 
received funding. In the second round, 157 applications were received, of which 142 were accepted; 10 of these 
projects were funded (FAQ ORA Plus ± 2012-2013). The overall success rates of the first three calls were as follows: 
1st call (2010): 12 per cent ; 2nd call (2011): 7 per cent ; 3rd call (2013): 8.5 per cent 
(http://www.esrc.ac.uk/_images/ora-2015-call-document_tcm8-32161.pdf, accessed March 2015). With the largest 
number of projects co-IXQGHGRXWRIWKH$15)UDQFHLQYHVWHGDWRWDORI¼0LQWKHILUVWFDOO7KH
second call of the programme aVDZKROHVDZ¼0LQYHVWHGLQWKHSURMHFWVE\WKHSDUWQHUV7KHWKLUGURXQG
LQFRUSRUDWHGWKH861DWLRQDO6FLHQFH)RXQGDWLRQWRWKHRULJLQDOFRQVRUWLXPDQGSURYLGHGDWRWDOIXQGLQJRI¼0
(http://www.nwo.nl/en/documents/magw/ora---press-release-r3 accessed March 2015). 
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multilateral schemes emerging in Europe after the creation of ERA and without EU support have been 
rare and those who survived normally involve non-ERA partners (bilateral schemes with China or India 
for examples). From that perspective, ORA offers an original case of intra-European joint initiative 
bypassing the EU normative environment.  
ORA also illustrates a new type of set up within national contexts of research governance. States not only 
delegate the operational control of the scheme WR³WKHLU´UHVHDUFKFRXQFLO, but also the decision regarding 
the extent of their financial commitment, ZKHUHE\³UHVHDUFKFRXQFLOVDUHEHFRPLQJDQDFWRURQWKHLURZQ´
(Lepori et al. 2014: 399). This agency ±led scheme therefore implies a relative similarity of structure of 
agencies (i.e. the research councils) in participating countries. In the case of ORA, the scheme became 
possible for the existing four partners after France had launched its national research agency in 2007.  
Yet ORA brings together well documented contrasting variants of the academic profession (e.g. see 
Teichler and Hohle 2013) as well as different higher education systems as far as their openness to 
international and dynamic competition is concerned (Marimon et al. 2011). A scheme that aims to 
integrate research across such diverse national academic contexts is necessarily one of compromise. 
Nevertheless, ORA sent a political signal to Europe regarding the capacity of national agencies to act as 
autonomous policy drivers of research collaboration. From its second call launched in 2011, the scheme 
also attempted to emerge as a broker for research involving collaboration outside Europe (ORA plus). In 
this respect, ORA can be classified as a niche programme (Lepori et al. 2014) symbolising a move by 
research councils towards forms and frameworks of elective collaboration with compatible counterparts 
in other parts of the world. 
 
$6KRZFDVHRIWKH(852+25&VDQG(6)µYLVLRQ¶ 
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As suggested earlier, the scale and financial commitments of ORA have been limited. In each 
participating country, the level of funding allocated per project is capped and commensurate with what is 
made available through standard national open calls. The scheme itself is not subject to agreed budgetary 
commitments by partner agencies. Thus, ORA (borne out of established bilateral agreements) poses 
limited budgetary risk to participating countries and requires limited amount of trust among agencies. 
This suggests that the initiation of programme was more instrumental in showcasing good practice in 
research management of national research funding, than attempting to impel social sciences in Europe in 
new directions. The scarcity of data on the first two calls of the scheme contrasts with the great number of 
references made to ORA in national agencies communications, and confirms that the novelty of the 
concept is the key message that agencies seek to convey. Assessing the scheme in 2011, Paul Boyle, 
Chief Executive of the ESRC, the UK research council, said:  
The success of the ORA scheme is a testament to the close working relationships which have 
developed in recent years between the ESRC and its partner agencies in Europe. Together we have 
demonstrated that national research funding agencies working in partnership can make significant 
strides towards the establishment of bureaucracy free methods of undertaking international 
research, without the need for excessive restrictions (ESRC Press release 31 01 2011) 
Whatever the acWXDO µVXFFHVV¶ of the scheme and the VLJQLILFDQFHRI WKRVH µVWULGHV¶DUH, the message of 
ESRC is a celebration of a selective approach to collaboration among leading European agencies. It is a 
message of realisation of WKH µvision¶ and µRoad Map of actions¶ defined by the councils¶ umbrella 
organisations back in 2008 2 . These programmatic actions were geared towards instituting common 
                                                          
2
 The Heads of European Research Councils (EUROHORCs) and the European Science Foundation (ESF) produced 
the EUROHORCs and ESF Vision on a Globally Competitive ERA and their Road Map for Actions. The document 
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approaches to refereeing and evaluating funding schemes, streamlining the collaboration between 
UHVHDUFKRUJDQLVDWLRQVSURPRWLQJµmoney follows researchers¶ principles and µOead agency procedures¶, 
facilitating collaboration with researchers outside Europe (EUROHORCs and ESF 2008). 
 
The proposed approach to grant selection and management in the Road Map (EUROHORCs and ESF 
2008) is not only appealing to governments and agencies keen to retain more control over these processes 
within collaborative schemes; researchers themselves, generally dissatisfied with procedures in public 
research funding (Marimon et al. 2011) are being attracted by discourses of freedom and flexibility. A 
funding scheme promoting support to the very best researchers ZLWKRXW µbureaucratic constraints on 
pHUVRQDO DQG ILQDQFLDO PRELOLW\¶ (EUROHORCs and ESF 2008: 3) was always going to appeal to a 
profession torn between the doxa of collegiality and the fierce individual competition both characterising 
the scientific field (Bourdieu 1999). Its appeal is further amplified by the individuation induced by 
performance and career management approaches which have been introduced in research institutions 
across Europe since the mid-1980s (Bleiklie et al. 2011; Musselin 2008).  
 
 5HVHDUFKHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVDQGUHVSRQVHVWRWKHVFKHPH 
 
We now turn to ORA funded researchers¶ perceptions of the scheme and how it meets, accommodates, 
allows for adjustments or perhaps collides with their conceptions and expectations of research 
collaboration. By international research collaboration we refer here WRWKRVHµstronger forms of scientific 
interaction¶ involving a µjoint research activity with a common aim or shared objective among scientists 
based at public research inVWLWXWHVLQGLIIHUHQWFRXQWULHV¶ (Ulnicane 2015: 434). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
RXWOLQHVLQSRLQWVWKH(852+25&VDQG(6)¶VSODQQHGFRQWULEXWLRQWRD³JOREDOO\FRPSHWLWLYH(XURSHDQ
5HVHDUFK$UHD(5$´S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According to funding partners, the early ORA calls attracted a lot of interest from the research community 
(see figures in note 1). This helped establishing the reputation of the scheme as competitive and of high 
standards, while further consolidating the largely shared assumption in policy circles that collaborative 
research is by definition of higher quality (Beaver 2004; He 2009). In reality, the number of applications 
received by the Councils and their success rates were consistent with usual figures for open calls at 
national levels. Furthermore, our analysis of awarded researchers¶ institutional positions and publication 
records from one of the early calls revealed high concentrations of seniority and esteem in project teams 
that tended to bring together, in some combination, researchers with previous shared collaborative 
experiences (joint supervision, co-investigations, co-publications). 
A convergence of interests seems to emerge between those highly networked researchers and a funding 
scheme claiming to offer them a platform for developing genuine integration in collaborative research. 
Also, the scheme appeared to move away from past  policy conceptions of interdisciplinary as a 
³SURJUDPPDWLF value tantamount to LQQRYDWLRQ´ (Weingart 2000: 26) and allow the unashamed 
development of niche DUHDV ILUPO\ VHW ZLWKLQ GLVFLSOLQDU\ FRPSHWHQFHV DQG ERXQGDULHV´ 3 . Yet, and 
perhaps unsurprisingly, researchers' discourses give insights into a plurality of expectations of research 
collaboration as well as more nuanced perceptions of the scheme and its ability to ensure greater scientific 
impact. They reveal in particular how individualV¶ views ± even among such de-territorialised 
collaborations- remain deeply anchored in institutional contexts and disciplinary cultures. Relating 
individual discourses to such structural dimensions of the academic profession as, epistemic identities, 
institutional environments and national performance management of research careers, offers a new 
perspective on the often unquestioned heuristic novelty and superiority of the model of international 
                                                          
3
 Of the fifteen funded in the first ORA call, fourteen were led by PIs from the same broad discipline (according to 
their PhD subject specialism).       
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collaboration induced by flexible schemes such as ORA. This approach also permits to reveal multiple 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV RI WKH ³FROODERUDWLYH YDOXH´ RI WKH VFKHPH E\ UHVHDUFKHUV UHIOHFWLQJ ERWK DOLJQHG DQG
contradictory logics of action of institutions and actors, rather than homogenous adaptive behaviours of 
agents to structural environments.  
 
 Another scheme, another opportunity: researchers' agendas first 
 
Most PIs involved in the early calls of ORA were mid-career to well-established academics. Most also 
had a track record of research grants as Principal (PI) or co-investigators (CoIs) nationally or 
internationally. Such profiles tend to attract research collaboration requests, and they can rely on wide-
ranging networks to monitor and seize funding opportunities in DW\SLFDOLOOXVWUDWLRQRIWKHµ0DWKHZHIIHFW¶ 
(Merton 1968). Networks certainly played a key role in the way most ORA PIs heard about the scheme, 
which in most cases, happened to map onto existing common research interests and collaborative funding 
pursuits.  
A funding complement  
A typical scenario, illustrated below, places the ORA call at the opportunistic end of a chain of joint 
projects. A Professor of Psychology from the Netherlands had been involved in a series of EU framework 
projects and bilateral initiatives as PI or CoI and was seeking funds to extend his latest project when he 
heard of ORA. That project was not necessarily conceived in terms that assumed cross-national 
collaboration: 
 Yes, the XXX study was first there, and collaborating with international colleagues and also as 
a follow up of a private study I did here « we thought it would be interesting to do a more 
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extensive study of basic changes due to treatment «. And then my German colleague 
discovered this funding possibility and we collaborated on writing the grant application. So 
that was first things first, but we were just in time to sort of, yeah, set them up in parallel. It 
was quite complex. But we were lucky to win the grant and to be able to co-ordinate the two 
VWXGLHV« (psychologist, Netherlands) 
Elsewhere, an international research team seizes the opportunity of a call that matches their immediate 
needs and offers the possibility of a speedy submission process:  
 
 Really just by chance, it was two weeks before the deadline of the call, we were searching for 
SRVVLELOLWLHVIRUIXQGLQJ>DGGLWLRQDOFDVHVWXGLHVIRUDQH[LVWLQJSURMHFW@EHFDXVHWKDW¶VLQGHHGD
problem to get funding for a specific bi-national project in Europe and, well, we found the 
25$VFKHPHDQG WKRXJKW³WKDW ILWVSHUIHFWO\´Dnd we submitted this proposal.(psychologist , 
Germany) 
  
In other cases, the search for funding had yet to start in a particular direction, but an operational network 
was in place at the tail end of collaborative experiences. In such cases, ORA came as a providence to re-
energize the collaboration: 
 
It was only when that European Commission money started to come to an end that both Denny 
and I wanted to continue this FROODERUDWLRQVDLG³2.OHW¶VVHHZKDW¶VRXWWKHUH´$QG,FDQ¶W
UHPHPEHULIKHRU,«,EHOLHYH'08.&R,IRXQGLWDQGVDLG³KH\WDNHDORRNDWWKLVWKLQJ´
± I think. But there must have been a website, there must have been some kind of information 
on thH(65&,GRQ¶WUHPHPEHUWREHSHUIHFWO\KRQHVWpsychologist, France). 
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A springboard call 
 
Different is the case where no on-going project was keeping the network active, but colleagues were on 
the lookout, ready to react at short notice: 
 
we had a meeting in Toulouse in France and were coming from The Netherlands, UK and 
*HUPDQ\ DQG WKHUHIRUH LW¶V VRPHWKLQJ OLNH D QLFH FRLQFLGHQFH WKDW ZH WKHQKHDUG DERXW WKLV
call for tender and realised this kind of opportunity there. So we had had already some kind of 
FRQWDFWV EHIRUH EXW ZHUH QRW DEOH WR GR MRLQW UHVHDUFK EHFDXVH ZH GLGQ¶W KDYH WKH VXLWDEOH
funding for this type of research thing (geographer, Germany) 
ORA came, T (PI) told me that V (other PI) had approached him and there was just an idea in a 
puE³ZK\GRQ¶WZHGRVRPHWKLQJRQ;;;´;;;ZDVP\UHVHDUFKIRFXVDQG WKHIDFW WKDW ,
had been involved in a lot of research projects and managing projects I think, made me open to 
this possibility, and immediately I had ideas of with whom we could network (political 
scientist , Netherlands) 
 
In all these scenarios, respondents have either a strong experience of bidding for project funding (and of 
tying projects to one another as in a chain), international research networks or a relationship built over 
years of professional collaboration and friendship. The ORA opportunity came in at a time when they 
were more or less ready to apply for new research funding. The biographical data collected confirm 
existing links of various types between members of a team: contrary to expectations, co-authorship of 
research publications was not the main expression of these links, while informal collaboration, joint 
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research projects, training networks or research unit-level formal partnership were frequently mentioned. 
Therefore, the scheme appears to have had little command over the composition of teams which were 
actually the offshoots of existing transnational networks. Analyses of evolving networks have already 
shown how highly connected nodes increase their connectivity faster than their less connected peers 
(Wagner and Leydesdorff 2005), the strong reputational capital of the PIs interviewed here increased both 
the size of the mobilised network and the speed at which information (on funding opportunities) was 
being shared within the network. Often this enabled them to submit proposals at short notice, as if they 
had been on the lookout for the appropriate funding source. The composition of project teams put forward 
for ORA often met the requirements and prescriptions of the scheme without challenging the epistemic 
identities of researchers and their pre-existing collaborative and investigative dispositions of PIs. 
 
³/RFDO RUGHUV´DQGLGLRV\QFUDVLHVRQWKHZHLJKWRILQVWLWXWLRQDODQGV\VWHPLQWHUIHUHQFHV 
 
As suggested earlier, PIs of ORA projects tend to operate at the core of their scientific area, as strategic 
nodes capable of efficiently drawing together partners. Well-networked academics have a great deal of 
personal control over their associations, yet they are agents operating in different institutions in which the 
changing modes of knowledge production have created new imperatives and priorities which keep 
evolving. Our interviews revealed different forms of institutional influence over the ways in which PIs 
approached collaboration. The prospect of holding a grant bearing both the label of a national research 
council and an international outlook is undoubtedly appealing to universities and departments in search of 
resources and visibility but their influence over the bidding process varies according to national contexts 
and governance arrangements.  
 
The institutional factor  
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Most countries around the world are now developing strategies to enhance the international visibility of 
their most reputed research institutions. A manifestation of this can be seen in the diversification of 
countries represented in international leagues tables of universities (Altbach 2011; Hazelkorn 2011).  
In terms of academic career, this is suggesting that the reputation of an institution is a crucial add-on 
ZKDW 0HUWRQ UHIHUV WR DV ³WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO YHUVLRQ RI WKH 0DWWKHZ HIIHFW´ 0HUWRQ 1968: 7) for 
academics operating in competitive and stratified higher education systems. In the UK for instance, 
universities positioned at the top of research league tables contribute to amplify the visibility and appeal 
of their researchers as collaborative nodes. In other countries involved in ORA such as France, 
universities may not secure such reputational capital, and membership of reputed CNRS4-accredited 
laboratories or capital city location often provide a better platform for building and fostering international 
networking capacity. Thus, although most researchers interviewed showed interest in the material and 
symbolic rewards of their successful ORA application, these did not invariably include institutional 
recognition. Our interpretation of discourses therefore needs to remain grounded in the idiosyncrasies of 
national higher education systems and their capacities to affect patterns of work at the individual level 
(Kogan 2002; Musselin 2008). Most comments made about reputation-driven institutional incentives and 
injunction to collaborate came from the UK. Elsewhere, institutional factors were much more commonly 
associated with internal politics or with direct pressure on academics to generate income.  
 
Institutional versus individual research reputation  
                                                          
4
 Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. CNRS laboratories (or research units) include 1) CNRS 
intramural labs: fully funded and managed by CNRS (called UPR, or unités propres de recherche, in 
French) and 2) Joint labs: partnered with universities, other research organizations, or industry (called 
UMR, or unités mixtes de recherche, in French). The latter may be hosted by universities even if they are 
largely staffed with CNRS tenured researchers. 
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Unsurprisingly, UK-based interviewed PIs work at research intensive universities, themselves well 
positioned in global institutional rankings. Mid-career respondents were the only ones occasionally 
referring in interviews to the µinstitutional factor¶ as enabling greater personal visibility. They would, in 
particular, hint at the importance of being part of a well-connected research grouping, centre or 
department in terms of accessing collaborative opportunities internationally:  
,W¶VHVVHQWLDOO\HYROYHG WKURXJKZRUNLQJZLWK XXX, who had already had some networks. We 
FROODERUDWHGRQ DSDSHU DQG WKHQ WKLV FROOHDJXH VDLG ³DFWXDOO\ WKLV ZRUN DOLJQV ZLWK ZRUN WKDW
,¶YHEHHQWDONLQJWRFROOHDJXHVLQ)UDQFHDQG7KH1HWKHUODQGVDERXW´DQG it sort of evolved from 
there. So it was sort of initially a locally- based collaboration, but through kind of connecting 
with that colleague and his networks it sort of evolved into a European collaboration (geographer, 
UK) 
 
In the above case, a mid-career researcher located at an internationally reputed unit is benefiting from the 
PI¶Vwillingness to hand over the leadership of the project. Elsewhere, the XQLW¶VUHSXWDWLRQapplied more 
directly: the department of a prestigious university was approached and the message passed on to the 
researcher by senior colleagues:  
$QGPHDQZKLOHP\GLUHFWRUDOVRFDPHWRPHDQGVDLG³KH\,'ve received this e-mail, I think you 
VKRXOGSDUWLFLSDWHLW¶VLQWHUHVWLQJ´SROLWLFDOVFLHQWLVW)UDQFH 
 
In such cases, the researcher is therefore delegated the responsibility to handle the reputational capital of 
the department. However, in highly competitive and successful environments, an ORA grant is not 
necessarily seen as panacea: 
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I would have expected bringing in the best part of half a million pounds might have been 
somewhat more appreciated than it was. There was no buy-out, so it just adds to my workload 
UDWKHUWKDQWDNHDZD\IURPLW« (political scientist, UK). 
 
Other references were made here and there to the fact that having the University of X or Y on a bid could 
be perceived by others as a booster but no respondent of more senior rank considered this as influencing 
their own individual reputation. If anything, senior academics were generally stressing that their own 
reputation was contributing to the reputation of their institution. They felt they primarily owed their 
success in ORA to their longstanding track-record in the field. Younger PIs meanwhile tended to invoke 
the primacy of their growing personal reputation for their involvement in an ORA team. However, 
whether this involvement resulted from a first approach to the department or from a personal initiative 
drawing on the credentials of the place, the common perception of collaborative practice as one building 
primarily on trust and mutual recognition did not change. 
Research reputation as an authority-capital built on social and professional recognition, allows and 
requires renewed endorsement by peers RU µpeer competitors¶ WRXVH%RXUGLHX¶VH[SUHVVLRQ. Although 
known to be of great value in FRQVROLGDWLQJDJHQWV¶ positions in the field (Bourdieu 1999), the catalytic 
effect, so to speak, of institutions rarely surfaces LQ UHVHDUFKHUV¶ GLVFRXUVHV This resonates with the 
conclusions of a recent qualitative study of academic reputation by O'Loughlin, MacPhail and Msetfi 
(2015) which highlights the divergent understandings of research reputation between institutions, drawing 
on new evaluation and measurement systems, and their academics. At the heart of DFDGHPLFV¶subjective 
perception ±variable according to the strength of subject identification and socialisation - is the 
µrecognition of a common or shared research perspective between academics, both of which affect how 
peers view and rate each other (and their instiWXWLRQVLQWHUPVRIUHSXWDWLRQ¶ (O'Loughlin, MacPhail and 
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Msetfi 2015: 813). This points to the persistence of norms and evaluation criteria shaped by 
professionalisation systems that are still operating alongside, or in spite of, institutional strategies. Yet the 
PRVW VHQLRU ILJXUHV LQ WKH PRVW ³UHFRJQLVHG´ DUHDV RI UHVHDUFK KDYH PRUH OHHZD\ WR GLVIUDQFKLVH
themselves from institutional factors and injunctions to collaborate, while their younger colleagues, who 
QHHG WKH VXSSRUWRI WKHLU LQVWLWXWLRQRUFHQWUH¶V UHSXWDWLRQ WR LQVHUW WKHPVHOYHV LQ³VWURQJ´ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
networks, may be ±whether they express it openly or not - more exposed to the requirements of 
institutional strategies. 
 
 
The collaborative injunction 
Institutional strategies playing out in research collaboration were mentioned by PIs in reference of the 
circumstances of the bidding process. For most, the ORA project came as relief (one more grant, one 
more box ticked) and as a let-off in enviroQPHQWV LQFUHDVLQJO\ GHILQHG E\ µmission definition, 
prioritization, research concentration and the need WREXLOG WHDPVDQGSDUWQHUVKLSV¶ (Henkel 2008: 96). 
Yet some distinctive patterns of institutional circumstances are worthy of note here. 
 
More cases of direct institutional injunction to apply for research funding were reported in the UK than 
anywhere else. The introduction of the full economic costing by the research councils in 2005 (whereby 
the research time of permanent staff involved is effectively subsidised by the grant) along with pressures 
related to the quantification of research income for nation-wide research evaluation exercises are said to 
be largely responsible for this climate (Deem 2006) . 
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In the case below, the financial contribution of the grant overshadows its symbolic value for a department 
located at a prestigious university in which similar achievements are part of the standard expectations 
about academic performance. The announcement of the grant generated an impassive response: 
«RQH VHQLRU PHPEHU RI WKH GHSDUWPHQW VDLG ³ZHOO GRQH´ WKH RWKHU VHQLRU PHPEHU RI WKH
GHSDUWPHQWVDLG³ZHOOGRQHWKDW¶VJRLQJWREHDORWRIZRUN´7KH6FKRROZDVYHU\SRVLWLYHDERXW
WKHDPRXQWRIPRQH\WKDW,¶GEURXJKWLWEXWLWGRHVQ¶WDIIHFWDQ\WKLQJ(...) DQGLWGRHVQ¶WHQKDQFH
my position at all as far as I can see (political scientist, UK) 
 
In this case, the grant is just one of many, and is welcome as such, but is not offering much comfort to the 
individual recipient (mid-career academic), as the institution is not prepared to increase her research time 
beyond the standard allocation that her position already entailed before the grant success. In this case, it is 
down to the researcher to fit it in. Yet the university is content to promote this new addition to its awards 
cabinet:  
 
,ZDVDVNHG\HVWHUGD\ WKH(65&DSSDUHQWO\DUHYLVLWLQJ WKLVPRQWKDQGDVNHG ³FRXOG\RXGRD
little impact study for us ± LI\RXWKLQN\RX¶YHJRWDQLPSDFW´political scientist, UK) 
 
 
Intuitional logics operate GLIIHUHQWO\DFFRUGLQJWRWKHXQLYHUVLWLHV¶SRVLWLRQLQJLQWKH8.PDUNHW+HUHD
SURIHVVRU RI (FRQRPLFV IHHOV WKH SUHVVXUH RI DQ LQVWLWXWLRQ¶V PDQDJHUial approach to research strategy 
where activities are more centrally directed and narrowly determined by consideration of income 
generation and other quantifiable outputs. 
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,KDGWKLVELJ9&RUZKDWHYHUVD\LQJ³GRWKHSURMHFW\RXPXVWDSSO\IRUWKHSURMHFW´DQGVRRQ
and so forth. OK so I did it. I spent 6 or 7 months doing nothing but preparing this bid. I got the 
SURMHFW$QG WKHQ WKH\VXPPRQHGPHDJDLQDQGVDLG³2.ZKHUHDUH\RXUSXEOLFDWLRQVZK\DUe 
\RXQRWVXEPLWWLQJDQ\WKLQJ´(economist, UK) 
 
The case above illustrates the limitations of the protective value of a research reputation in management 
FRQWH[WVZKHUHLQVWLWXWLRQV¶UHVHDUFKLQFRPHGHSHQGGLUHFWO\RQWKHLUVWDII¶SURGXFWLYLW\ 
 
,Q RWKHU SDUWLFLSDWLQJ FRXQWULHV ZKHUH DFDGHPLF SRVLWLRQV DUH QRW VR FORVHO\ WLHG XS WR LQVWLWXWLRQV¶
research income and where evaluation is used as a performance management tool rather than a resource 
allocation instrument, the pressure was more likely WREHDVVRFLDWHGZLWK³JHWWLQJVRPHWKLQJ´LQRUGHUWR
JHWJRLQJZLWKRQH¶VUHVHDUFKZKLOHHQKDQFLQJWKHUHSXWDWLRQRIWKHLQVWLWXWLRQ 
 
:HOO,ZRXOGVD\LW¶VLQIRUPDOWKHUH¶VQRIRUPDOLQFHQWLYHVOLNH\RX¶UHJHWWLQJPRUHPRQH\DQG
so on, but yes informally the feedback and stuff is highly appreciated, and for example the head 
RI P\ GHSDUWPHQW VD\V WKDW LW¶V JRRG IRU RXU GHSDUWPHQW DQG WKH ZKROH LQVWLWXWLRQ EHFDXVH
LQWHUQDWLRQDOSURMHFWVDUHKLJKO\UHJDUGHG6R,ZRXOGVD\LW¶VDELWPRUHDSSUHFLDWHGWKDQnormal 
')*IXQGLQJVRWRVD\ZKLFKLVDOUHDG\YHU\KLJKO\DSSUHFLDWHG´psychologist, Germany) 
 
, GRQ¶W IHHO SUHVVXUH IURP P\ 'HDQ IRU H[DPSOH WR EHFRPH PRUH FROODERUDWLYH RU JHW PRUH
funding, although it has become more or less the implicit rule that you take the opportunities that 
you see. (sociologist, Netherlands) 
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In the above situations the grants were welcome by institutions for their symbolic and financial value. 
International collaboration operates as capital enhancer for universities, and researchers are expected to 
show an international profile commensurate with their seniority. Interviewees from France, Germany the 
Netherlands were all prompt to stress the value of ORA for the visibility and reputation of their university, 
and to acknowledge how getting the funding consolidated their own position within it, without reporting 
the forms of direct injunction revealed above about the UK context.  
Overall, the forms of institutional pressures reported tended to reflect distinct patterns of research 
governance and incentivisation. Institutions either embraced the integrative conception of collaboration 
expressed in the ORA call or encouraged their staff to bypass it in favour of the ³FRQVRUWLXP´ W\SHs of 
projects that fit more readily in their organisational culture and in their QDWLRQDO UHVHDUFK FRXQFLO¶V
requirements. In seeking alliances and partnerships for their proposal, researchers preparing ORA bids 
had to anticipate those institutional expectations as well as juggle with the differences between national 
research councils brought together around a loosely defined collaborative objective. Few saw these as 
obstacles requiring well planned and clearly articulated strategies. Rather, interviews confirm how highly 
established researchers draw on the register of experience and implicit knowledge of their environment to 
explain the success of their collaborative enterprise. 
 
Ownership beyond leadership: trust in collaborative project management 
ORA is somehow disrupting the usual habits of conducting funded research in social sciences because the 
scheme does not define in any prescriptive ways the type of collaboration expected beyond stating that 
projecWV ³PXVW LQYROYH LQWHJUDWHG FROODERUDWLRQ EHWZHHQ SDUWQHUV´ 25$  DQG UHTXHVWLQJ RQH
principal investigator per country, who in the main reports to their national research agency.  
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Unusual in social science funding schemes across Europe, the request of multiple PIs in ORA is close to 
the multiple-PD/PI model typically applied in Health and Science subjects to µfacilitate multidisciplinary 
and other types of team science projects that are not optimally served by the single-PD/PI model¶ 
(National Institutes of Health 2011). In the case of ORA though, there is no guidance related to the 
multiple PI model apart from the fact that each PI is accountable to their national funding agency. 
While unanimously expressing their satisfaction with a scheme imposing less interference and steering 
than many, researchers acknowledged that they had not experienced this model before and that it implied 
some adjustments to their usual practice of one overall leader and a single accountability channel. 
Consequently, the ORA leadership model seemed to be challenging expected patterns of authority. In 
particular the multiple PI model disrupts the conscious act of role-playing implied in large ± and often 
interdisciplinary - collective bids where a PI is identified - who may or may not be the most authoritative 
voice in the team - to whom, however, all others temporally agree to be subordinated. This is where the 
question of trust and shared values surfaces, expressed in different ways by researchers, but always linked 
to this unusual model of governance: 
\RX GRQ¶W KDYH WR EH EHVW IULHQGV RI FRXUVH EXW VWLOO WKHUH PXVW EH D ORW RI WUXVW D ORW RI
FRQILGHQFHDORWRI«\HDK\RXPXVWMXVWEH«,PHDQHDFKSURMHFWSDUWQHULQWKHZD\ZHKDYH
set this up could have ruined a lot for the others. And we trusted each other, we knew what 
everybody would do (linguist, Germany) 
 
What I really remember was that things were very helpful by, I think all the partners being very 
clear about the value of the project, I think that was a very clear thing, that we all knew that this 
was something that we were really keen to do, we had a very kind of strong idea of the proposal 
(geographer, UK) . 
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In the only four-country interdisciplinary project, bringing together PIs with significant influence in their 
field, the resulting tensions revealed the high level of instrumentality thrown in the collaborative 
enterprise. One of the researchers explained how he felt he led the research funding application, seeing 
himself as natural PI up to a slip of the tongue: 
7KH SURMHFW LV EDVLFDOO\ D IHGHUDWHG SURMHFW WKLV PHDQV EDVLFDOO\ LW¶V D QHWZRUN RI QDWLRQDO
SURMHFWVDQGDVDSULQFLSOHLQYHVWLJDWRU,GRQ¶WKDYHDORWRILQIOXHQFHRQWKHUHDOZRUNWKDWLV
being done in the other (teams) (sociologist, NL) 
Returning to the issue later in the interview: 
I think I made maybe a bit of a shortcut in claiming that I was the principle investigator of the 
SURMHFWDQGVR,GLGQ¶WPHDQWRSOD\GRZQWKHUROHRI6EXWZKDW I mean is that what I expect 
from a principle investigator is an attempt to also intellectually make combinations from the 
different traditions, and in this project this is not so easy because these traditions are really very 
different (sociologist, NL) 
 
This leads us to the issue of preserving national models of accountability in cross-national research 
funding schemes aiming to stimulate high levels of interaction and 'jointness'. 
 With no lead agency, and a multiple PI model with separate funding and accountabilities, ORA poses a 
challenge to traditional expressions of leadership authority in research collaboration, and in the process, 
tends to magnify differences, particularly in larger and more interdisciplinary teams. Here the frictions 
and misunderstandings do not arise from imposing a uniform top down leadership on individuals from 
different cultural backgrounds and epistemic traditions as often reported in EU-IXQGHG ³IUDPHZRUN´
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projects ; on the contrary, researchers turn to the more or less established, rigid cultural assumptions 
associated with national types prevailing within epistemic communities:  
But then of course there is also the kind of broader intellectual academic culture issue in that 
people tend to frame different things, you know, French has a very different way of framing a 
kind of a problem or approaching the framing of a problem than say the more pragmatic English 
or Dutch framing. I mean the English and the Dutch in some ways are the closest I think on this 
project in termVRI LQWHOOHFWXDODSSURDFKRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZKDW¶V LQYROYHGDQG WKH)UHQFK
are probably the most removed in a way from the English understanding (sociologist, UK) 
The reflections collected clearly show how a multiple PI funding scheme can unsettle relationships in 
teams, particularly where leadership of research grants counts as much as publications in performance 
indicators and career progression. The model of the single PI in European social sciences has long been 
established as RQHRI WKRVH ³FU\VWDOOLVLQJ DJHQWV´ /XXNNRQHQ DQd Nedeva 2010) that contribute to the 
regulation of the scientific field, or more specLILFDOO\IRURXUIRFXVWRWKHµforced agreement¶ (Bourdieu 
1999: 33) deemed necessary to the integration of international interdisciplinary research teams. While 
aiming to stimulate integrated collaboration (ORA 2012), ORA has the potential to disintegrate those 
'forced agreements' by allowing individual researchers to control equally important dimensions of the 
research, in the absence of mechanisms of agreed subordination. Yet, despite the tensions and frictions 
reported above, this disintegration did not occur in the projects we examined. For many of these, the 
reason is to be found in the socio- epistemic cohesiveness of the networks out of which the bidding teams 
were constituted. By cohesiveness, we refer to the level of cognitive integration of project teams as well 
as the social cohesion of these groups made of reputed scholars in their field and established academics in 
their institutions. Even in the most competitive collaborations (ORA also stimulates intra-project 
competition with this multiple PI approach), collaborators ± even the most frustrated by the lack of 
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vertical integration in their project ± had no interest of derailing a collective enterprise associating them 
with internationally reputed colleagues and/or organisations and thus reinforcing their own scientific 
authority. In most cases, despite its challenges, the multiple PI system is seen as generating freedom and 
allowing organisational innovation. In others, the scheme supports alliances of minimum common 
expectations of utility among individuals competing for scientific authority. As Luukkonen and Nedeva 
(2010: 677) put it: 
The extent to which the entity is cohesive depends on the clarity, communication and level of 
acceptance of the dominant expectations of utility. Respectively, the extent to which members 
integrate successfully into the entity depends on whether their expectations of utility and the 
expectations of utility of the entity are similar or compatible 
 
General conclusion  
 
The paper sought to shed light on the conception of research collaboration underpinning a particular 
funding scheme in the social sciences, and on its interpretation by funded researchers in order to ascertain 
the current permeability of the scientific field to policy incentives and pressures. 
After reviewing the context of emergence and broad orientations of the ORA scheme, the paper presented 
DZDUGHG UHVHDUFKHUV¶ reflexions on their collaborative experience within the scheme, and the extent to 
which they felt it differed from their previous experiences of international collaborative research. We 
sought to illustrate how collaboration - presented by funders and academics alike as proxy for research 
excellence and as a core value to the profession - remains highly polysemous across a diverse European 
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social science field as well as deeply rooted in local models of public governance and institutional 
configurations (Thoenig 2003; Paradeise and Thoenig 2013). 
First the scheme itself, as we have shown, can be understood as a political statement on research 
governance by key European science national self-governing funding agencies in the context of the 
European Research Area. For this reason, we suggested that the originality of the scheme lay essentially 
in its timing, its integrative ambitions (expressed in the 2008 ESF EUROHORCs road map) and in its 
governance WKH ³condominium PRGHO´ DV H[SUHVVLRQ RI WKH LQFUHDVLQJO\ SURDFWLYH UROH RI LQVWLWXWLRQV
and funding agencies in research processes).  
 
While the scheme undoubtedly supports transnational collaborative experiences and networks, the 
collaboration it induces maintains participating researchers LQDVWDWHRIDQVZHUDELOLW\WRµlargely localised, 
mainly nationally bound, reseDUFKVSDFHV¶ (Nedeva 2013: 221), thus allowing space for local social orders 
within the international nature of the call. For instance we have shown how tKHUHVHDUFKHUV¶FRPPHQWVRQ
their ORA experience revealed contrasting work cultures and institutional loyalties. Universities and 
research organisations (including national councils) are in particular impacting within significant national 
variability RQWKHVFKHPH¶VRSHUDWLRQDOL]DWLRQZLWKWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIZRUNORDGDOORFDWLRQDQGRWKHUFRVW
±consciousness measures such as the full economic costing, or by imposing rules on the contractual 
position of principal investigators. Variable levels of institutional recognition of research collaboration 
were also perceptible in the contrasting support JUDQWHG WR UHVHDUFKHUV¶ collaborative efforts. Finally, 
despite well documented isomorphic trends (Bleiklie et al., 2011; Shore and Taitz, 2012), national higher 
education funding models continue to influence the level of incentivisation of research and research 
collaboration within universities and to steer research activities more generally through a combination of 
economic and political controls (Paradeise and Thoenig 2013). They too influence the formation of 
research collaboration networks and their level of integration. 
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,WZRXOGEHWHPSWLQJWRUHDGDFDGHPLFV¶UHVSRQVHVWRWKHVHSUHVVXUHVLQWHUPVRIDGDSWLYHVWUDWHJLHVEXW
this would hide the richer, more nuanced and subtle experiences and explanations encountered in this 
research. Interviews revealed that the scheme either funded rather established groups of collaborators or 
collaborations that partially branched out of these groups, and that teams initially approached ORA the 
way they would consider more familiar funding sources (such as national agencies, EU framework of 
bilateral schemes). The specificities of the scheme usually unfolded at a later stage of the bidding process. 
If orDQ\WKLQJUHVHDUFKHUV¶ Iirst encounters with and initial reading of the scheme revealed first, the key 
role of research networks in horizon scanning for funding opportunities and second, the autonomy granted 
E\µUHSXWDWLRQ¶ZLWKLQWKHVFLHQWLILFILHOGLQUHODWLRQWRIXQGLQJVWUategies. Respondents often referred to 
ORA as a funding scheme introducing requirements minimally impacting on their research idea and 
choice of partners (to do ³ZKDWZHZDQWHG WRGR´, to complement some existing funding, to work with 
people they liked, to ease temporary institutional pressure, etc). In this, they tended to reduce the value of 
the scheme to a tool at their disposal to help them consolidate collaborations and steer their research in a 
particular direction. 
Yet, accounts of actual collaborative practices, especially from participants in the largest and more 
interdisciplinary four-country projects, revealed how much the scheme disrupted established patterns of 
collaboration, and in particular the principle of a negotiated subordination associated with the single PI 
policy. All principal investigators admitted to being insecure within the multiple PI framework, whether 
perceiving it as an obstacle to integration, or seeing in it as opportunity for newly defined terms of what 
counts as cross-national collaboration.  
As limited as it is in terms of budgetary commitment, the ORA funding scheme exemplifies significant 
trends of policy directions in the European social sciences. Firstly, it offers a concrete illustration of the 
key role of leading European national funding councils in the steering of international research practice 
through the construction of (highly visible) collaborative models. Secondly, ORA appeals to researchers 
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by claiming back the primacy of research excellence over EU-type redistributive policies and bureaucratic 
interference. In doing so, the scheme does not signal the return of collaborative practice of old, but rather 
reveals more subtle interdependencies between the fields of science and science policy, where controls 
and power operate at both institutional (performance management), national (funding), and international 
(partnerships, peer review) levels. As such, this is not novel, as scientific collaboration somehow always 
occurs µwithin the larger social context of science, which includes elements such as peer review, reward 
systems, invisible colleges, scientific paradigms, and national and international science policies, as well 
as diVFLSOLQDU\ DQG XQLYHUVLW\ QRUPV¶ (Sonnenwald 2007: 646). However and most importantly, by 
reinforcing the networking capacity of established researchers, and adopting a much commended non-
bureaucratic rhetoric, the scheme is playing a deceiving game: it allows the distribution of power and 
monopolies operating within the field of social sciences to express itself at the application stage, and later 
on introduces patterns of cooperation and accountability that challenge it. In doing so it favours the 
³ µFHQWUDO¶ SOD\HUV WKH RUWKRGR[ WKH FRQWLQXHUV RI QRUPDO VFLHQFH´ &DPLF   but ultimately 
destabilises them, at least temporarily, with unorthodox management practices that appear to better suit 
those least endowed with capital (by offering status equivalence and visibility to PIs of each projects) or 
highly complementary teams in their methodological expertise or access to data. Hence a certain 
ambivalence in the UHVHDUFKHUV¶ YLHZV about a ³QRQ-interventionist´ scheme that although ostensibly 
embracing their collaborative doxa, introduces mechanisms of power sharing and answerability which in 
turn challenge their capacity to regulate internally the individual roles and relationships at work in 
research collaboration. 
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